Issuances and Repurchases: An explanation based on CEO risk-taking incentives by Rashid, Harun
Issuances and Repurchases: An explanation based on CEO risk-
taking incentives 
 
A Thesis submitted to the College of 
Graduate Studies and Research 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Science in Finance 
in the Department of Finance and Management Science 
Edwards School of Business University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada 
 
by 
Harun Rashid
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Harun Rashid, April 2013. All rights reserved.
i 
 
Permission to Use 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from 
the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely 
available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, 
in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who 
supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the 
College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or 
use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written per-
mission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of 
Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.  
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in whole or part 
should be addressed to:  
 
Head of the Department of Finance and Management Science 
Edwards School of Business 
University of Saskatchewan 
25 Campus Drive 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
There is an ongoing debate on whether risk-taking incentives align risk-averse managers’ inter-
ests with those of shareholders or whether such incentives lead to excessively risky firm and lev-
erage policies. In this study, we shed light on this debate by using CEO risk-taking incentives, 
measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock return volatility (Vega), and ex-
plain how Vega affects firms’ security issuance and repurchase activities. In general, we find that 
a higher Vega increases (decreases) the likelihood of debt issuance (share issuance) and it de-
creases (increases) the propensity of debt retirement (share repurchase).  However, in high-
levered firms, the positive effect of Vega on debt issuance and the negative influence of Vega on 
debt retirement are diminished. One the other hand, for equity issuance and repurchases, high 
leverage does not seem to alter the impact of Vega. These findings have three main implications: 
1) in general, CEO risk-taking incentives (Vega) do affect the financing decisions of firms by 
increasing firms’ degree of leverage, (2) when existing leverage is high, CEO risk-taking incen-
tives do not seem to induce CEOs to take excessive financial risks through debt issuance, but 
such incentives encourage them to continue repurchasing shares that would lead to even higher 
debt ratios and non-operational risks, and (3) firms  with high Vega do not seem to adopt target 
debt ratios. 
JEL Classification: G30, G32, J33 
Key Words: Compensation incentives, risk taking incentives, external financing, capital struc-
ture 
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1 Introduction 
There is an ongoing debate on whether risk-taking incentives align risk-averse managers’ inter-
ests with those of shareholders or whether such incentives lead to excessive risk taking (Eisdor-
fer, Giaccotto and White, 2013; Lin, Chou, and Wang, 2012; Dong, Wang and Xie, 2010; Fran-
cis, Hasan and Sharma, 2011). We further explore this debate using CEO risk-taking incentives 
embedded in compensation incentives. The sensitivity of managers’ wealth to changes in stock 
return volatility is measured by Vega, which we define as the sensitivity of CEO wealth to a 1% 
change in stock return volatility. Compensation incentives supposedly align managers’ interests 
with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To this end, Vega encourages overly 
risk-averse managers to take on more risks, thereby aligning their interests with those of share-
holders. Various studies show that Vega is positively related to risky firm characteristics such as 
stock return volatility (Cohen, Hall and Viceira, 2000 and Guay, 1999) and leverage (Cohen et 
al., 2000; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). However, an overly 
high Vega could have unintended consequences: equity-type compensation induces managers to 
over-invest (Eisdorfer et al., 2012) or adopt an excessively risky leverage policy (Dong et al., 
2010). Dong, Wang, and Xie (2010) show that CEOs with high Vega are likely to choose debt 
over equity in order to raise capital even when firm leverage is beyond its target ratio.
1
 On the 
other hand, Albring et al. (2011) and Meneghetti (2012) argue that compensation incentives in-
duce managers to be monitored by lenders. Hence, it could be argued that such monitoring helps 
prevent firms from taking on excessive risk. Moreover, Jensen (1986) argues that leverage disci-
plines managers. Accordingly, if an over-levered firm attempts to issue debt, it faces strong re-
sistance from lenders. In general, the effect of Vega on corporate risk-taking (or excessive risk-
                                                 
1
However, the concept of a target leverage ratio itself is a problematic issue, as there lacks consensus on what target 
leverage should be (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Jong, Verbeek, and Verwijmeren, 2011). 
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taking) is thus far unclear.  
We explore a hitherto overlooked facet of the impact of Vega on corporate risk-taking by 
investigating the channels of external financing through which Vega affects firm leverage. Spe-
cifically, we explore how Vega affects debt issuance, share issuance, debt retirement, and share 
repurchase. While it is known that Vega induces firms to adopt a higher leverage policy, how this 
takes place is unclear. Firms could issue more debt or repurchase stock to increase leverage. Evi-
dence from existing research suggests CEO compensation incentives have direct impact on debt 
issuance. However, whether high Vega results in excessive debt is an open question. For in-
stance, Shaw (2011) documents that higher pay-performance sensitivity leads to a lower cost of 
new debt, implying that new lenders view compensation incentives favorably. Thus, we expect a 
positive (negative) association between Vega and debt issuance (share issuance). However, when 
leverage is already high, CEOs with a higher Vega could be deterred from issuing debt by exist-
ing lenders, or the CEOs themselves may avoid increasing leverage further to avoid costs of fi-
nancial distress. Conversely, we expect a negative (positive) relation between Vega and debt re-
tirement (share repurchase), because share repurchasing increases leverage and debt retiring re-
duces leverage. However, this relation should also be conditional upon the level of existing lev-
erage. 
Using a sample of 15,623 firm year observations between 1992 and 2006, we empirically 
investigate the relation between Vega and external financing decisions. We present strong evi-
dence that Vega impacts debt issuance (share issuance) positively (negatively), and debt retire-
ment (share repurchase) negatively (positively). However, in high-levered firms, while leverage 
mitigates the impact of Vega on debt issuance and debt retirement, it does not alter the influence 
of Vega on equity issuance and repurchases. Therefore, contrary to Dong et al. (2010), we find 
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that Vega does not induce managers to issue debt if firm leverage is already high.
2
 In general, our 
evidence suggests that a higher Vega causes firms to increase leverage through debt issuance and 
share repurchase. Our evidence also indicates that, in high-levered firms, a higher Vega induces 
CEOs to take on more risks through repurchasing shares.  
We make at least three contributions to the literature of finance. First, we complement the 
study of Coles et al. (2006) by identifying the main channels through which CEOs increase firm 
leverage. To the best of our knowledge our study is the first work that examines such channels. 
Second, our study is the only work that investigates the relationship between sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to the changes in stock return volatility and security repurchases (debt retirement and 
share repurchase). Third, our study is also the first study to show that CEOs’ risk-taking behavior 
induced by risk-taking incentives is conditional upon a firm’s debt ratio. Vega’s influence on 
debt issuance and debt retirement in a low-levered firm is different from its influence on a high-
levered firm.
3
 For example, we find that CEOs with a higher Vega in high levered firms tend to 
avoid issuing debt but are likely to continue repurchasing shares and increase financial risks fur-
ther. Dong et al. (2010) argue that risk taking-incentives encourage CEOs to take on excessive 
risks through debt issuance in order to increase their wealth from stock options holding. We 
show that risk-taking incentives fail to motivate CEOs to issue debt in high-levered firms.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: The literature review and hypothesis develop-
ment is presented in section 2. In section 3, data and methodology are presented. Results and 
analysis are included in Section 4. Section 5 offers robustness tests and Section 6 concludes.  
                                                 
2
Methodologically our study is different from the study of Dong et al. (2010). For instance, they use a subsample of 
over-levered firms and we use a dummy variable to define high-levered firms and interact it with Vega; they ignore 
security repurchase in defining security issuance, and we use net proceeds of security issuance; they use firm charac-
teristics to measure target debt ratio, we use industry adjusted leverage, which is a proxy of target debt ratio.  
3If a firm’s yearly industry adjusted leverage is above 75 percentile of the same industry for the same year then it is 
defined as a high-levered firm.   
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2 Related Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
Managers and shareholders both are risk-averse. However, managers, unlike shareholders, can-
not diversify firm specific risks. Therefore, they tend to avoid taking risky but positive NPV pro-
jects. This tendency of avoiding risk creates conflicts of interest between managers and share-
holders. An effective way of minimizing this conflict is to give managers some ownership as part 
of their compensation. Equity-based compensation incentives are designed to align managerial 
interests with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The classic empirical work of 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) provides some evidence in favor of this theory. They find that (p. 
225) “…the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for 
chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in 
shareholder wealth.” Compensation incentives are also intended to encourage managers to per-
form better by adopting risky firm policies if these policies enhance firm value. Two important 
characteristics of compensation incentives are the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock 
price (Delta) or the pay-performance sensitivity, and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in 
stock return volatility (Vega). Current literature uses the one year approximation proxy method 
developed by Core and Guay (2002) to measure these two sensitivities from compensation incen-
tives.
4
  
Whether pay-performance sensitivity (Delta) makes managers seek or avoid risk is an un-
settled issue in the literature (Coles et al., 2006; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). John and 
John (1993) find Delta is negatively associated with leverage. Similarly, Brockman, Martin and 
                                                 
4
Contrary to the widely used measures of compensation incentives, Lewellen (2006) measures managerial financing 
incentives as the change in certainty equivalent wealth of CEO due to changes in leverage. Lewellen (2006) argues 
that compensation incentives make managers risk averse and reports that higher financing incentives increase the 
likelihood of preferring equity over debt. 
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Unlu (2010) find Delta is negatively associated with short-term maturity debt. Knopf, Nam, and 
Thornton (2002) argue that Delta make managers risk averse. Ross (2004) argues that high level 
of Delta incentivizes managers to avoid risk. Coles et al. (2006, p. 431) explain “...higher Delta 
can mean that managers will work harder or more effectively because managers share gains and 
losses with shareholders. Of course, another effect of increased Delta is to expose managers to 
more risk ... Accordingly, it is possible that managers will forgo some positive net present value 
(NPV) projects if those projects are very risky.”  
Prior studies suggest that Vega encourages managers to take on more risks (Guay, 1999; 
Knopf et al., 2002; Coles et al., 2006). It is well documented that a higher Vega is positively re-
lated to risky firm policies. Specifically, Cohen et al. (2000), and Guay (1999) investigate the 
relation between Vega and firm risks using stock return volatility. Both studies find there is a 
positive relation between Vega and firm risks. Low (2009) links Vega and risk taking behavior to 
antitakeover provisions. She finds that low Vega firms reduce risks when they have an increased 
level of antitakeover provisions. Gormley, Matsa and Milbourn (2012) find that a higher Vega 
has positive effect on leverage and R&D, and has negative effect on cash reserves and diversify-
ing acquisitions. Particularly relevant to our study is the relation between Vega and leverage. 
Higher Vega firms maintain higher leverage (Cohen et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2006; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010), which in turn makes equity riskier. Albring et al. (2011) report that 
measures of CEO compensation incentive sensitivities- Delta and Vega- are positively associated 
with issuance of syndicated debt.
5
  
Do compensation incentives lead to excessive risk-taking? Dong et al. (2010) examine the 
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Albring, Khurana, Nejadmalayeri and Pereira (2011) argue due to information asymmetry borrowing funds from 
financial firms signal firm profitability which increases market value. As a result, managers’ wealth increases. 
Hence, managers are willing to be monitored by financial intermediaries when their compensation is tied with firm 
performance. 
6 
 
effect of compensation incentives on the likelihood of share and debt issuances. They argue that 
managers take excessive risk in financing decisions to increase their wealth. Using a sub-sample 
of over-levered firms they show that CEOs with higher Vega are more likely to issue debt instead 
of equity even when firms are over-levered. Hence, they argue Vega induces managers to adopt 
excessively risky leverage policies that go beyond the target leverage. However, there is a selec-
tion bias in creating a sub-sample of over-levered firms. Their argument also raises questions 
regarding target leverage and excessive risk taking. According to Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and Jong, Verbeek, and Verwijmeren (2011), non-financial firms do not have any target 
debt ratio. Jong et al. (2011, p. 1304) state “for issue decisions, we find that only a small minori-
ty of the firms that have above-target leverage in a given year issue equity instead of debt. 
Hence, most firms increase their leverage, even when they are already above their estimated tar-
get….the static trade-off theory is not a strong predictor of firm issuing decisions.” Besides, 
Francis et al. (2011) contend that compensation incentives prevent managers from over-investing 
because such incentives align managers’ wealth with firm value. Jensen (1986), Albring et al. 
(2011) and Meneghetti (2012) also suggest that lenders monitor managers. Hence, naturally, 
lenders will prevent managers from taking on excessive debt. Therefore, Dong et al.’s (2010) 
claim that a higher Vega causes CEOs to take excessive risk needs further investigation. Moreo-
ver, the authors ignore security repurchases in defining security issuances. In many cases firms 
issue and repurchase securities simultaneously, and if the proceeds from repurchase exceed the 
proceeds from issuance, then only considering issuance is likely to give misleading evidence.  
Before exploring other channels of financing further, it is useful to briefly review tradition-
al capital structure theories. The static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory offer two 
different explanations about the capital structure of a firm. The static trade-off theory asserts that 
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firms have a target debt ratio where the marginal benefit of borrowing balances the marginal cost 
of borrowing.  As long as a firm is under that target ratio, it will issue debt and increase leverage 
in order to reap the benefits of borrowing such as tax shield advantage. On the other hand, the 
pecking order theory predicts that due to the high cost of information asymmetry, firms issue 
stocks to undertake risky projects only when other sources of financing such as retained earnings 
and debt (both low risk and high risk debts) are exhausted (Myers, 1984, and Myers and Majluf, 
1984).  Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) contend that changes in leverage take place for the 
need of external financing and not to reach a target debt ratio.  Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
find evidence that non-financial firms do not have any target debt ratios.  They argue that the 
static trade off theory does not have the power to explain capital structure, but the pecking order 
theory does. However, Fama and French (2005) oppose the validity of the pecking order theory 
and show that stock issuance is not limited to financially constrained firms only. Gatchev, Spindt 
and Tarhan (2009) also do not find evidence in favour of pecking order theory.  Jong, Verbeek, 
and Verwijmeren (2011) examine the conforming and conflicting areas between the pecking or-
der theory and the static trade-off theory in order to evaluate one’s superiority over the other in 
explaining financing decisions. They show that most firms issue debt until they reach their debt 
capacity, and do not follow any target debt ratio, which is consistent with the pecking order theo-
ry. However, they find that the static trade-off theory is a better model in explaining repurchas-
ing decisions. They report that under-levered firms repurchase shares to reach their target debt 
ratio. Hence, these two capital structure theories suggest that a firm choses such a debt ratio that 
increases shareholders wealth. Similarly, we expect Vega to motivate CEOs to maintain, through 
external financing activities, such a capital structure that increases firm risk and at the same time 
improves firm value. 
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Share repurchase has become a common cash payout policy to shareholders (Skinner 
2008). Signalling and free cash flows are the two main theories of share repurchases. However, 
prior evidence suggests that managerial compensation incentives such as options have significant 
impact on share repurchases. There are two hypotheses that link share repurchases with execu-
tive compensation incentives: the option funding hypothesis and the substitution hypothesis 
(Kahle, 2002). Chance and Yang (2011) argue that, in the absence of desirable investment pro-
jects, executives benefit from options holding by repurchasing shares. Bhargava (2011) examines 
how the value of stock options of executives affects share repurchase and finds that share repur-
chase is insignificantly related to the values of executive stock options granted but that the values 
of options realized in the previous year are positively associated with share repurchase.  Fried 
(2011) attributes biased external financing decisions that favor managers’ wealth over firm 
wealth or societal wealth to equity based compensation incentives. He argues that equity based 
compensation encourages managers to issue shares when the market share price is above their 
worth and repurchase them when the price is below the actual value. In both cases managers’ 
wealth improves but not aggregate shareholder wealth (both old and new shareholders). Also, he 
argues, that this kind of financing decision does not improve the overall value of a firm.  
2.2 Hypotheses 
Existing literature suggests that Vega is positively associated with risky firm policies and that 
debt issuance increases firm risk.  
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive association between Vega and debt issues, ceteris paribus.  
Although we expect that Vega positively affects issuance of debt, our expectation differs 
for high-levered firms. Lenders are aware of CEO risk-taking incentives. Therefore, if leverage is 
already high, lenders would prevent CEOs from increasing it further. In addition, when leverage 
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is already high, CEOs themselves are likely to avoid issuing debt due to the costs of financial 
distress. Thus, high leverage reduces CEO risk-taking incentives.  
Hypothesis 1b: The positive effect of Vega on debt issues diminishes in high-levered firms, ce-
teris paribus. 
Issuing shares to undertake investment opportunities reduces both firm leverage and equity 
risk. Since, CEO wealth increases with increased risk-taking activities, we expect to see a nega-
tive association between Vega and equity issues. 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a negative association between Vega and share issues, ceteris paribus.  
However, if the debt capacity is saturated, firms would have little choice but to issue equity 
to finance new projects. 
Hypothesis 2b: The negative effect of Vega on share issues diminishes in high-levered firms, 
ceteris paribus.  
Security issuance is not the only means to affect leverage. Security repurchases (both 
debt and share) affect leverage as well. While repurchasing shares increases leverage or firm 
risk, retiring debt decreases it.  
Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative association between Vega and debt retirement, ceteris pari-
bus.  
Although we expect that Vega typically influences debt retirement negatively, high lever-
age may prevent lenders from extending new credit, which would lead to net debt retirement re-
gardless of CEO risk taking incentives. Thus, we expect high leverage to reduce the negative im-
pact of Vega on debt retirement. 
Hypothesis 3b: The negative association between Vega and debt retirement diminishes in high-
levered firms, ceteris paribus.  
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Repurchasing shares increases leverage and evidence indicates that Vega implies higher 
debt ratio. Bernanke (1989) argues that share repurchase increases debt ratio and improves a 
firm’s efficiency and operations. 
Hypothesis 4a: There is a positive association between Vega and share repurchase, ceteris pa-
ribus.  
However, if a firm already has high leverage then lenders may restrict share repurchasing.  
Hypothesis 4b: The effect of Vega on likelihood of share repurchase diminishes in high-levered 
firms, ceteris paribus.  
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and Sample 
We use three different databases to collect our data. We collect balance sheet, cash flow, and in-
come statement related items from Compustat. Stock return data are collected from CRSP. CEO 
compensation related data are collected from Execucomp. Interest rates of 10-year-constant ma-
turity treasury bonds are collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Our sample co-
vers the period from 1992 to 2006. Execucomp reports data starting from 1992. Consistent with 
previous studies we eliminate financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC 4900-
4999). After merging data from all sources we eliminate firms if their assets or sales are missing. 
We replace missing values of R&D expenditures with zeros. Finally we have a total of 15,623 
firm-year observations. We winsorize all variables at the 1
st
  and 99
th
 percentiles. 
3.2 Variables 
 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Share issue is defined as the proceeds from sale of common and preferred stock (SSTK) minus 
the purchase of common and preferred stocks (PRSTKC) scaled by book value of total assets. 
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Debt issue is measured as the proceeds from long-term debt issuance (DLTIS) minus the reduc-
tion in long-term debt (DLTR) scaled by book value of total assets. 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Main variable 
Vega, which measures risk-taking incentives, is measured as the change in value (in dollars) of 
CEO wealth (value of options) for a 1% change in annualized stock return volatility. We use dai-
ly stock return standard deviation multiplied by √252 to annualize the stock return volatility. De-
tails to construct Vega are provided in the appendix section. 
Important control variables 
Delta, which measures performance incentives, is defined as the change in value (in dollars) of 
CEO wealth (value of options, restricted stock grants, and stocks) for a 1% change in stock price. 
Details to construct Delta are provided in the appendix. 
Sales is measured as log(1 + total sales). Total sales is measured in millions. Sales is a proxy for 
firm size. 
Assets is log (1 + book value of total assets). Book value of total assets is donated in millions. 
We use Assets as a proxy of firm size for robustness. 
Cashflow is defined as EBITDA scaled by book value of total assets. Intuitively, cash flow has a 
direct impact on debt and share issuance. Cashflow is also a proxy for firm profitability. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests that firms with a higher level of Cashflow issue less equity (Dong et al., 
2010; McLean, 2011), although evidence is mixed for debt.  
Leverage is the ratio of total long term debt to book value of total assets. We control for long-
term debt rather than total debt because debt and share issuance are mostly affected by the degree 
of long-term debt. The current liability portion of total debt varies mainly with net working capi-
12 
 
tal requirements.  
Industry_adjusted_leverage is defined as the leverage minus yearly industry mean leverage 
based on 2-digit SIC code. Industry mean or median leverage is widely used as a proxy for target 
debt ratio (see Gilson, 1997; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001; Faccio and Masulis, 2005).  
High_leverage is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one when the industry adjusted 
long-term debt ratio is in the top quartile (i.e. above 75 percent of sample leverage) for a given 
year. Highly levered firms are less likely to issue debt because of financial distress and lender 
credit rationing.  
MB is the ratio of firm market value of total assets to its book value of total assets. Market value 
of total assets is measured as the number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the fiscal 
year-end stock price plus the redeemable value of preferred stock plus total long and short term 
debt. MB is a proxy for firm growth. Higher MB firms require more external financing to meet 
growth requirements. Some studies use MB as a proxy for market overvaluation of assets. 
Capex is the amount of capital expenditures scaled by total book value of assets. Higher Capex 
indicates a greater need for external financing. 
Additional Control variables 
Cash is defined as cash and cash equivalent assets scaled by book value of total assets. Firms 
with higher cash reserves need less external financing. Holding cash for precautionary motives 
(McLean, 2012) or meeting short term liquidity needs may lead to share issuance (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz, 2010). 
Dividend equals cash dividends scaled by book value of total assets.  
GPPE is calculated as value of gross property, plant, and equipment scaled by book value of to-
tal assets. GPPE can be used as a proxy for total tangible assets.  
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RD is defined as research and development expenditures scaled by book value of total assets. 
The literature suggests that RD can be used as a proxy for precautionary motives (McLean, 2011) 
and for information asymmetry (Tong, 2010).  
Rating is a dummy variable indicating if the overall long term credit rating of a firm is available. 
Not all firms in our sample have credit ratings, so when we use actual credit rating instead of a 
dummy we lose about half of the observations from our sample. Meneghetti (2012) uses a dum-
my variable for investment grade credit rating. 
CEO Wealth is CEO total compensation comprising the value of salary, bonus, restricted stocks 
granted, stock options granted, long-terms incentives, other annual, and all other total. CEO 
wealth may make managers risk averse because all his portfolios are in one basket. On the other 
hand, CEOs may want to work hard to improve the firm value and thereby increase his total 
wealth. Therefore, no matter what role CEO Wealth plays in risk-taking it is important to control 
for it especially during carrying out the external financing activities.  
3.2 Methodology 
Depending on the motivation, different studies use different sets of control variables for debt and 
share issuances. The most commonly used variables are firm fundamentals, such as size (either 
assets or sales), leverage, profitability or cash flow, market to book ratio, capital expenditures or 
asset tangibility (either gross or net property plant and equipment ), and industry mean (median) 
leverage. These explanatory variables for security issuance are similar to those that affect capital 
structure. The variables used by Rajan and Zingales (1995) (market to book ratio, profitability, 
asset tangibility, and sales) are also widely used in the literature to determine leverage. Using a 
sample of 270,000 firm year observations for the period between 1950 and 2003, Frank and 
Goyal (2009) investigate the important factors that influence capital structure and find that the 
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most important factors of market leverage are median industry leverage, the ratio of market to 
book value of assets (MB), asset tangibility, firm profitability, firm size (log of assets), and ex-
pected inflation.  
Therefore, we use the following model: 
, + +
 everage__ 
tit71-it61-it51-it4
1-it321
i
itittiit
CapexCashflowMBSales
LadjustedIndustryDeltaVegaY




 (1) 
where Yit represents a dependent variable such as Debt Issue, Share Issue, Debt Repurchase and 
Share Repurchase  for firm i for year t.
6
 We use current year Vega and Delta because compensa-
tion incentives of the current year are likely to influence the risk taking behavior and perfor-
mance of managers in the current year. Thus, for capital structure decisions, the contemporane-
ous Vega and Delta of managers are important. Similarly we use contemporaneous Capex (capi-
tal expenditures) because capital expenditures of the current year better represent the need for 
external financing. For sales (firm size), leverage, cashflow (profitability), and MB (firm 
growth), we use prior year observations. Whether a firm issues debt or equity depends on the 
prior year firm fundamentals. For example, if a firm was highly profitable in the previous year 
then it is less likely to need external financing. Similarly, if leverage in the prior year was high, 
then a firm has less capacity to issue debt.  
 In equation (1) we expect β1 to be positive for debt issue and share repurchase and nega-
tive for share issue and debt retirement. In the model we also include other control variables 
such as GPPE, R&D, credit rating dummy, and others. For highly levered firms we modify 
Model 1 and introduce an interaction term between Vega and prior leverage. We expect the coef-
ficient of this interaction term to be negative for debt issue and share repurchase and positive for 
                                                 
6
For logistic regressions, the dependent takes on the value of one for firms that issue/repurchase equity/debt, zero 
otherwise. 
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share issue and debt retirement. 
.__ +
_* _ 
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 (2) 
For logistic regressions, the dependent variables are constructed subject to specific thresh-
olds of debt issuance or share issuance of 1% or 0.5% of total assets.
7
 We also control for year 
and firm fixed effects. For robustness we control for endogeneity between leverage and compen-
sation decisions—the CEO is likely to have substantial influence over both—by using 2SLS re-
gression. Results are consistent with our main results. 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 1. The 
sample average (mean) net debt issue and net share issue are about 1.6% and 0.3% of total as-
sets respectively. These figures suggest that the amount of total proceeds from debt issue is 
much higher than that of share issue. The average Vega and Delta are $121,618 and $763,205 
respectively. Hence, executive stock options do provide substantial incentive for CEOs to in-
crease equity return volatility. These figures are comparable to the mean values of Vega and 
Delta reported in Liu and Mauer (2011) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The average long-term leverage of the sample is 18.63% and average cash is 14.21% of to-
tal assets. This finding indicates that the firms in the sample on average have enough cash to pay 
                                                 
7
In the literature, most studies define security issuance or repurchase as instances where firms wither issue or repur-
chase at least 5% or 10% of total assets. These studies either cover a long period or use gross issuance or repurchas-
es and therefore, even at 5% or 10% of total assets, the sample size remains large. In our study, we use net security 
issuances and repurchases covering a period of only 15 years. As a result, when we use net security issuance or re-
purchases 5% of total assets, only a small sample size remain which, we believe, does not represent the issuance and 
repurchase behavior of the entire sample.  
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off most of their long-term debt. The average cash holding is also more than average cash flow 
(13.93% of total assets) for our sample firms. We find that the market to book (MB) ratio of the 
sample is 1.88. This mean value is consistent with Francis et al. (2011) who report in their paper 
that the average Tobin’s Q is 1.87. The mean value of tangible assets (GPPE) is 55% of total as-
sets. On average, R&D (RD), capital expenditures (capex), and total cash dividend payouts (divi-
dend) are 3.6%, 6.5% and 1.06% respectively.  
4.1.1 Sensitivity of share and debt issues based on 4 quartiles of Vega and leverage 
Table 2a illustrates the differences in mean debt issues undertaken by CEOs with high Vega and 
CEOs with low Vega after controlling for different levels of leverage ratios. We create 16 portfo-
lios based on four quartiles of Vega and four quartiles of leverage. As can be seen from Table 2a, 
in firms with low leverage (LL1), as risk-taking incentives increase from low Vega (V1) to high 
Vega (V4), the mean net debt issue increases monotonically. The difference in the mean debt is-
sue between low Vega and high Vega is 1.02% of total assets. This difference is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level which suggests that higher Vega indeed encourages CEOs to increase 
debt ratios. On the other hand, debt issuance decreases steadily for the CEOs with high Vega 
when the leverage increases from low to high quartile. For instance, when the CEOs have high 
Vega, the difference in the mean net debt issue between low-levered firms and the high-levered 
firms is 1.64% of total assets, implying that, on average, high Vega CEOs in low-levered firms 
issue 1.64% more debt compared to high Vega CEOs in high-levered firms. These two results 
imply that Vega encourages CEOs to take on more risk by issuing more debt but this risk-taking 
behavior of the CEOs is conditional on firm leverage and is not as apparent when the leverage is 
high. In contrast, when CEOs have low Vega we find that there is no statistically significant dif-
ference in debt issuance decisions between low-levered and high-levered firms. This finding 
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suggests that when Vega is low, various levels of debt ratio do not significantly affect CEO debt 
issuance decisions.  
[Insert Table 2a here] 
Similarly, we use 16 portfolios to test differences in share issuance between quartiles of 
CEO Vega interacted with quartiles of leverage. As can be seen from Table 2b, in low-levered 
firms (LL1), low Vega CEOs (V1) issue shares that represent about 2% of total assets while the 
high Vega CEOs (V4) repurchase shares amounting to 1.92% of total assets (as indicated by the 
negative coefficient). This finding implies that in low-levered firms, low Vega CEOs decrease 
leverage by issuing shares while high Vega CEOs increase leverage by repurchasing shares. This 
difference in share issuance between a low Vega CEO and a high Vega CEO is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. It is useful to recall from Table 2a that, for low Vega firms, the volumes 
of debt issues are not significantly different between high- and low-levered firms.  However, the 
findings are different for equity issues: as leverage increases, equity issues increase (or equity 
repurchases decrease) for both high and low Vega firms. 
 [Insert Table 2b here] 
4.2 Correlations 
The Pearson correlation matrix between the pairs of dependent and independent variables are 
presented in Table 3. We find that log of Vega is positively (insignificant) correlated with debt 
issuance and negatively correlated with share issuance. The correlation finding between share 
issuance and Vega is not surprising because share issuance does not increase leverage or firm 
risk, and therefore we see a negative correlation between these two variables.  We also find that 
Vega is positively correlated with leverage. Since, debt issuance increases leverage, this is also 
consistent with our argument that Vega positively affects debt issuance. However, we find that 
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Delta is negatively correlated with leverage: pay-for-performance sensitivity (Delta) makes 
managers risk averse.  We also find that log of (1+ Vega) and (1+Delta) are positively correlated 
with sales, market to book ratio, cash flow and dividend. The correlation between the log of Ve-
ga and Delta is 0.57. To avoid multicollinearity concerns, we also include these variables one at 
a time in our regressions.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Regression Results 
4.2.1 OLS regression results: 
Who Issues debt? The relation between debt issue and Vega 
We present the results of OLS regressions for testing Hypotheses 1a in Table 4. The dependent 
variable is debt issue and the main independent variable is Vega. Column 1 shows that Vega is 
positively associated with debt issue. Columns 2-5 include control variables and show that the 
coefficient for Vega remains positive. Thus, CEOs with higher Vega issue more debt when ex-
ternal financing is required. This finding is consistent with Albring et al. (2011) and Dong et al. 
(2010). Columns 3-5 test the effect of Vega on debt issue while controlling for Delta. Delta has 
little impact on debt issue; however, the positive association of Delta, although insignificant, is 
consistent with Albring et al. (2011) and Meneghetti (2012). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Table 4, the estimates of other control variables are also significant. Prior year leverage 
is negatively associated with debt issue, which suggests that lower-levered firms issue debt and 
higher-levered firms avoid issuing debt. Using sales as a proxy for firm size, we find smaller 
firms issue more debt. Likewise, firms with higher capex, higher prior year MB, Cashflow
8
, and 
lower cash reserves issue more debt. The positive effect of Cashflow on debt issue implies that 
                                                 
8
When we use current year Cashflow we find that it has a negative association with debt issuance.  
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profitable firms are able to raise debt at a lower cost. MB can represent better growth opportuni-
ties, so higher MB firms may need more debt financing to meet their growth needs. Here, MB 
does not represent equity mispricing, because equity overvaluation should lead to issuance of 
equity (Loughran and Ritter, 1995) rather than debt.  
How does Vega influence debt issues in a high-levered firm? 
In Table 5 we test hypothesis 1b. We present regression results to show whether Vega encour-
ages managers to take excessive risk. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue, compensation in-
centives are designed to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. We argue that such 
incentives are likely to dissuade managers from carrying out excessive risk taking activities that 
are detrimental to firm value. If leverage is already high, lenders being aware of CEOs risk-
taking behavior would prevent them from increasing leverage further. Therefore the interaction 
term between Vega and lagged high_leverage, which tests the effect of Vega in the presence of 
high leverage, should be negative. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the interaction 
term has a negative coefficient. Furthermore, the sum of the coefficients of Vega and the interac-
tion term is not significantly different from zero, which implies that Vega has no effect on debt 
issues in high-levered firms. This finding suggests that although Vega encourages CEOs to issue 
debt to increase leverage, the positive effect of Vega on debt issues diminishes when leverage is 
already high. Therefore, a higher Vega does not necessarily lead to excessively risky firm poli-
cies, which contradicts Dong et al. (2010), who contend that, even in over-levered firms, Vega 
induces managers to issue more debt and adopt excessively risky leverage policies. Our evidence 
suggests that in high-levered firms CEOs with a higher Vega avoids taking on excessive opera-
tional risks by not issuing more debt.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Who Issues Shares? The relation between share issues and Vega 
In Table 6, we present results of OLS regressions for testing Hypotheses 2a. The dependent vari-
able is share issue and the main independent variable is Vega. Column 1 shows that Vega is neg-
atively associated with share issue, and the rest of regressions report similar results. This result is 
consistent with our argument that risk-taking incentives (Vega) have a negative effect on share 
issues. Pay-performance sensitivity (Delta) is included in the last four columns. We find that 
while Vega impacts share issue negatively, Delta has a positive influence.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The estimates of control variables are also significant. For instance, prior leverage is posi-
tively associated with share issue. In addition, we find that firms that are smaller in size, have 
higher MB, lower cashflow, lower cash holdings, higher capex, higher RD, and higher GPPE is-
sue more shares. These findings are consistent with theory and previous empirical evidence 
(McLean, 2011). We also find that Dividend payers issue fewer shares.  
How does Vega influence share issues in a high-levered firm? 
In Table 7, we test hypothesis 2b. As in the case of debt issue, we introduce the interaction term 
between Vega and lagged high_leverage. We include this term to investigate the effect of Vega 
on share issues in a firm that already has high leverage. We argue that, in order to undertake a 
risky but value-increasing project, CEOs with higher Vega issue shares when the leverage is high 
because at that point issuing debt will either be costly for them due to high risk of financial dis-
tress or will be prevented by lenders. However, if the project has a positive NPV, the CEOs with 
higher Vega will undertake the project by issuing shares. Thus, we expect that the interaction 
term to have a positive effect on share issue. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the 
interaction term has a positive coefficient. However, when we test the sum of the coefficients of 
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Vega and the interaction term using an F-test, we find the sum is negative and significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Therefore, in high-levered firms Vega`s negative effect on share issue does not 
alter. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.2.2 Logistic regression results 
Who is likely to issue debt? The relation between debt issuance and Vega 
In Table 8, we present the logistic regression results of debt issuance. Debt issuance is a dummy 
variable that equals one if net debt issuance is at least 1% of total assets. Column 1 presents the 
impact of Vega on debt issuance. The coefficient for Vega is significantly positive, implying 
CEOs with higher Vega are more likely to issue debt. In Column 2 we include firm specific fun-
damentals such as sales, leverage, MB, cashflow and capex. We find the coefficient of Vega still 
remains positive and significant. In Column 3, controlling for Delta does not change the impact 
of Vega on debt issuance. However, Delta does not significantly affect debt issuance.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In Table 5, we found that the presence of high leverage weakens the positive relation be-
tween Vega and the amount of debt issued. To test if high leverage also affects the likelihood of 
issuing debt, we consider the interaction term between Vega and lagged high_leverage. In Table 
9 we find the coefficient of the interaction term is negative. This finding implies that the effect of 
Vega on the likelihood of issuing debt is diminished for highly leveraged firms. From this evi-
dence we can infer that when existing leverage is high, CEOs with higher Vega fail to issue debt 
for new projects due to lenders’ monitoring. We also carry out a chi-square test and find that the 
overall influence of Vega in highly levered firms is not statistically significant. In general, these 
results are similar to those of OLS estimates. 
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[Insert Table 9 here] 
Who is likely to issue shares? The relation between share issuance and Vega  
In Table 10, we present the logistic regression results of share issuance. Here share issuance 
equals one if net share issuance is 1% or more of total assets, zero otherwise. The results pre-
sented in the 5 columns test Hypothesis 2a. In Column 1 we include only Vega and find that the 
coefficient of Vega is insignificantly negative.  After controlling for Delta and factors such as 
leverage, MB, cashflow and others, the coefficient of Vega remains negative and strongly signifi-
cant in column 3, 4 and 5. We also find that the firms that have higher MB (growth opportuni-
ties), capex, RD, and lower cash as well as cashflow are more likely to issue shares.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
We hypothesize that higher Vega CEOs tend to avoid share issuance, but if leverage is al-
ready high, then they will issue shares to undertake projects. We expect the coefficient of the in-
teraction term between Vega and prior year high_leverage to be positive. In Table 11, we present 
the results of the interaction term, which is positive but not significant. Joint test between the co-
efficient of Vega and the interaction term shows that the combined effect of Vega on share issu-
ance remains negative. From this evidence, it appears that high leverage fails to alter the negative 
impact of Vega on share issuance.    
[Insert Table 11 here] 
Who is likely to retire debt? The relation between debt retirement and Vega 
Corporations often change their capital structures by retiring debt. Since Vega induces higher 
leverage but retiring debt reduces it, we expect Vega to have a negative impact on debt retire-
ment. From the sample evidence in all of the 5 columns of Table 12, we find the coefficient of 
Vega is negative, suggesting CEOs with higher Vega are less likely to retire debt. Delta also neg-
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atively affects the likelihood of debt retirement. As for other control variables, our sample evi-
dence shows that firms with higher sales, industry_adjusted_leverage, and GPPE but lower MB 
and capex tend to retire debt.  
[Insert Table 12 here] 
Vega’s role in debt retirement could also be different for high-levered and low-levered 
firms. Hence, we introduce the interaction term between Vega and prior year high_leverage. We 
expect the interaction term to be positive for high-levered firms because lender’s pressure will 
diminish the negative influence of Vega on debt retirement. In Table 13, we find the interaction 
term has a positive and significant coefficient suggesting that influence of Vega on debt retire-
ment in high-levered firms is likely to be different from its influence in low-levered firms. We 
conduct a chi-square test to examine if the coefficient of Vega and the coefficient of the interac-
tion term are jointly significant. We find that they are not jointly significant, implying Vega has 
no effect on debt retirement among highly levered firms, so the influence of high leverage sup-
presses the negative impact of Vega on debt retirement. 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
Who is likely to repurchase shares? The relation between share repurchase and Vega 
Share repurchase is a dummy variable that equals one if net share repurchase is at least 0.5% of 
total asset, zero otherwise. Columns 1-5 of Table 14 test hypothesis 4a. In column 1, only Vega 
is included. The significantly positive coefficient of Vega is consistent with our hypothesis that 
higher Vega CEOs are likely to repurchase shares. In Column 2, we include prior year explanato-
ry variables such as sales, MB, leverage, cashflow, and current year capex. The coefficient still 
remains positive and significant. In Column 3, we include Delta, which does not significantly 
influence share repurchase, but the coefficient of Vega still remains significantly positive. In 
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Columns 4 and 5, we include more explanatory variables and find that the positive influence of 
Vega does not change, suggesting that a higher Vega induces managers to repurchase shares to 
increase firm risk by increasing leverage. Regarding other control variables, we find that while 
sales, cashflow, and cash, have positive impact on the likelihood of share repurchase, leverage, 
capex, RD, MB and GPPE have a negative impact.  
[Insert Table 14 here] 
To test hypothesis 4b we investigate the influence of Vega on share repurchase in high-
levered firms. The regressions in Table 15 include an interaction term between Vega and prior 
year high_leverage dummy to investigate this effect. We expect the coefficient of this interaction 
term to be negative. However, we find that interaction term is negative but not significant, which 
implies that even in high-levered firms CEOs with higher Vega continue to repurchase shares. 
Joint test also shows that the combined effect of Vega and the interaction between Vega and 
high_leverage is significantly positive.   This finding also suggests that by repurchasing shares 
CEOs with a higher Vega pursue excessively high leverage policy which increases financial 
risks.  For other explanatory variables, coefficient signs remain the same and the significances 
also remain similar to the evidence we have found in Table 14. 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
5 Robustness Checks 
In unreported regressions, we use various definitions of high leverage. For instance, high lever-
age is also defined as when a firm’s leverage belongs to the top quartile of entire sample leverage 
or top quartile of industry adjusted leverage for the sample period. Moreover, we use interaction 
term between industry adjusted Vega and leverage as well as between Vega and indus-
try_adjusted_leverage, and so forth. We find that in all of these cases our findings do not change. 
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In Table 16, we define over-levered firms if the firms’ long-term leverage is above their 
target leverage. We estimate the target leverage based on firm fundamentals. Our target debt ra-
tio model is built on Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Dong et al. 
(2010). Using model 3, we regress long-term leverage on firm fundamentals and store the pre-
dicted values which are proxies of capital structure for each firm for each year. By defining over-
leverage based on this target debt ratio, we continue to find that over-leverage mitigates the ef-
fect of Vega on debt issuance and debt retirement but it has no power to diminish Vega’s effect 
on share issuance and repurchases. When we conduct chi-square test, we find that the coeffi-
cients of Vega and the interaction term combined are insignificant for debt issuance and retire-
ment but significant for share issuance and repurchase. These findings about the effect of Vega 
on external financing in the over-levered firms are consistent with our earlier presented results 
where we use high_leverage which is defined based on industry adjusted leverage. 




DummiesIndustryDummiesYear
RDGPPEMBCashflowSizeLeverage 543210   
 (3) 
[Insert table 16 about here] 
 
As part of the robustness checks, in the rest of the tables we use industry unadjusted lever-
age, high_leverage and low_leverage to examine if our results are sensitive to other measures of 
leverage. In Table 17, we examine the effect of Vega on debt issues in the presence of both high 
leverage and low leverage.  We use both Vegat * high_leveraget-1 and Vegat * low_leveraget-1 
interaction terms to investigate the effect. Although the evidence is weak, we find that while the 
coefficient of Vegat* high_leveraget-1 is negative and opposite to the coefficient of Vega itself, 
the sign of the coefficient of Vegat* low_leveraget-1 is positive and corresponds with the sign of 
the coefficient of Vega. We also conduct joint F-test between the coefficients of Vega and Vegat 
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* low_leveraget-1 and find that the effect of Vega on debt issues in low-levered firms is signifi-
cant. On the other hand, when we conduct joint test between the coefficients Vega and Vegat * 
high_leveraget-1 we do not find any significant result. This finding suggests that, when leverage 
is low, a higher Vega causes a higher amount of debt issues However, when the leverage of a 
firm is high, it is not the case. Therefore, only high leverage plays an important role in mitigating 
the impact of Vega on debt issuance. In Table 18, we show that while high_vega (low_vega) af-
fects debt issues positively (negatively), it affects share issues negatively (positively). The im-
pact of high_vega and low_vega on security issues indicate that CEOs with high_vega increase 
leverage but CEOs with low_vega avoid taking risks by not increasing leverage. We also find 
that high-levered firms tend to avoid issuing debt whereas low-levered firms issue debt. And the 
results are opposite for share issues.    
[Insert table 17 about here] 
[Insert table 18 about here] 
Although we use lagged leverage to mitigate any concern of causality or endogeniety, for 
robustness, we conduct 2SLS. In the 2SLS in Table 18, we regress Vega on contemporary lever-
age, lagged leverage and other control variables in the first-stage regression. In the second re-
gression, we regress debt issue on the estimated Vega from the first-stage regression. We find 
that the relationship between debt issue and Vega still holds. The coefficient of Vega still re-
mains positive and strongly significant (at a 1% level). In the first stage, we also find that prior 
year leverage does not have any significant impact on Vega. Therefore, there is no concern of 
causality between current year Vega and prior year leverage. In addition to the previously used 
control variables, we use three CEO-specific variables such as CEO wealth or total compensa-
tion, cash compensation, and age of the CEOs. We find that cash compensation is negatively re-
lated to debt issuance whereas age is positively related to debt issuance, suggesting that CEOs 
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with more years of experience tend issue more debt. Our finding regarding the negative effect of 
cash compensation on debt issue is consistent with the argument of Berger, Ofek, and Yermack. 
(1997). The authors consider cash compensation as a proxy for risk aversion. However, Guay 
(1999) argues that a higher amount of cash compensation make CEOs less risk averse because it 
allows them to be better diversified by making outside investments.  
[Insert table 19 about here] 
6 Conclusions 
The objective of managerial compensation incentives is to align managers’ interests with those 
of shareholders. Risk-taking incentives (Vega) measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth to 
stock return volatility encourage CEOs to undertake risky firm policies such as increasing lever-
age. However, according to Jensen’s (1986) controlling hypothesis, leverage disciplines manag-
ers. Hence, a natural question arises—does Vega effectively increase firm risk in highly levered 
firms? In other words, does Vega lead to excessively risky leverage policy? We shed light on this 
question by investigating the relation between Vega and four avenues of external financing deci-
sions: debt and share issuances and repurchases. Each of these avenues affects capital structure 
or leverage directly. Our results show that while, in general, Vega is positively (negatively) asso-
ciated with debt (share) issuance, it is negatively (positively) associated with the debt retirement 
(share repurchase).  However, in high-levered firms, Vega does not significantly affect either 
debt issuance or debt retirement. But for equity issuance and repurchases high leverage does not 
seem to alter the impact of Vega: CEOs are likely to continue repurchasing shares and avoid is-
suing them even when leverage is high. And our findings are consistent with the theory that Vega 
encourages managers to increase firm risk and the degree of leverage of a firm. Our study has 
important  implications for corporate finance discipline: 1) Vega acts as a risk-taking incentive 
for under-levered firms, 2) In high-levered firms Vega does not encourage CEOs to take on more 
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debt to avoid potential excessive operational risks arising from a new project but it continues to 
induce CEOs to repurchase shares which may lead to excessive non-operations risks, and (3) The 
fact that high-levered firms avoid issuing debt but are likely to continue repurchasing shares sug-
gests CEOs with a higher Vega do not seem to follow target debt ratios. 
Appendix 
Vega and Delta construction: 
Vega is measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth (in dollars) from holding stock options to a 
1% change in the annualized stock return volatility. .  
 
Delta, which measures performance incentives, is defined as the change in value (in dollars) of 
CEO wealth (value of options, restricted stock grants, and stocks) for a 1% change in stock price. 
 
For the computation of Vega and Delta we use the method described by Core and Guay 
(2002) which is based on the Black-Scholes [1973] formula modified to include the dividend ef-
fect.  
 
0.01*
atility)return vol(Stock ue)/option val Scholes-(Black*owns) CEO options of # (total=Vega 
 
where 
  T(Z)P N' eatility)return vol(Stock ue)/option val Scholes-(Black -dT  
0.01*P*(Z) N e*owns) CEO options of(number =(options) Delta T*-d  
TdiTXPZ  /)]2/()/[log( 2   
Where N′ = the normal density function 
N = the cumulative density function 
P = market price of the underlying stocks 
X = exercise price of options 
σ = expected stock return volatility over life of option 
i =  risk-free interest rate 
T = time to maturity of the option calculated in years 
d = expected dividend rate over the life of options 
 From ExecuComp we obtain the market price of the underlying stocks, the exercise price 
of the options, and the time to maturity of the options. From Compustat we collect dividend 
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yields which are used as a proxy for expected dividend rate over life of options. Dividend yield is 
measured as dividend payment per share over market price of the share. We  measure the proxy 
of expected stock return volatility over life of options by annualizing the volatility of daily stock 
returns- the standard deviation of daily stock returns times √252. We collect 10-year Treasury 
constant maturity rate at fiscal year end from Federal Reserve Bank as a proxy of risk-free inter-
est rate (see Tong, 2010). From the option expiration date reported in ExecuComp, we calculate 
the time to maturity of the options. With these items we can calculate both Vega and Delta of 
newly granted options. However, the time to maturity and the exercise price of the previously 
granted options are not directly available in ExecuComp. Therefore, we undertake the following 
steps to measure the time to maturity and the exercise price.  
 
First, we divide the previously granted options as exercisable options and un-exercisable 
options (Core and Guay, 2002, and Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006). Then we find the exercise 
price and the time to maturity for each of them separately. 
To compute the exercise price of exercisable options we use the following approach.  
optionseexercisablofnumber
optionseexercisablofvaluemoneytheinstockunderlyingtheofpricemarket
optionseexercisablofpriceexerciseAverage
/

 
We estimate the time to maturity of exercisable options as T – 4 years (see Core and Guay, 
2002). Similarly, the average exercise price for the un-exercisable options is estimated as the cur-
rent price of the underlying stock minus in the money value of un-exercisable options minus the 
value of newly granted options over the number of un-exercisable options minus the number of 
newly granted options.  The time to maturity of un-exercisable options is computed as the time to 
maturity of the current year’s options grants (T) minus one year. Now, we can compute the 
Black-Scholes option value, Delta, and Vega of previously granted options as well. 
 
         optionsgrantedpreviouslyofvegaoptionsgrantednewlyofvegaVega   
optionsgrantedpreviouslyofdeltaoptionsgrantednewlyofdeltaoptionsofDelta   
Since, Guay (1999) finds that the value of restricted stock and shares is insignificant com-
pared to the Vega from options, we ignore them in our Vega calculation. 
0.01*price*stocks trictedstocks/res ofnumber  = stocks rictedstock/rest of Delta  
)
(
holdingsstockrestricted
stocksoptionsgrantedpreviouslyoptionsgrantednewlyofdeltaDelta


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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the dependent and control variables. Debt issue is the proceeds 
from gross debt issuance minus the amount of gross debt retired. Share issue is the proceeds from com-
mon and preferred share issuance minus gross share repurchase. Vega is the change in CEO wealth from 
stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEO wealth due to a 
1% change in stock price. Sales is log(1 + proceeds from sales). Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt 
over book value of total assets. MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
GPPE is gross property, plant and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled 
by book value of total assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. RD is 
total expenditures of research and development scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital ex-
penditure scaled by book value of total assets. Dividend is total cash dividends payout scaled by book 
value of total assets. The sample covers the period between 1992 and 2006 inclusive. 
 
Item N Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
Debt issue 15,623 0.0162 0.0854     -0.0152 0 0.0300 
Share issue 15,623 0.0037 0.0794     -0.0139 0.0007 0.0096 
Vega 15,623 121,618 237,373 17,816 47,851 122,756 
Delta 15,623 763,205 2,111,103 85,296 216,463 588,345 
Sales 15,623 7.0482 1.6310 5.9912 7.0000 8.0801 
Leverage 15,578 0.1863 0.1625 0.0307 0.1677 0.2905 
MB 15,556 1.8808 1.5498 0.9605 1.3799 2.1613 
Cashflow 15,567 0.1393 0.1057 0.0936 0.1425 0.1960 
Capex 15,468 0.0648 0.0589 0.0278 0.0489 0.0815 
GPPE 15,546 0.5496 0.3611 0.2682 0.4654 0.7607 
Cash 15,617 0.1420 0.1733 0.0194 0.0658 0.2037 
RD 15,623 0.0360 0.0610 0 0.0042 0.0481 
Dividend 15,623  0.0106 0.0163 0 0.0021 0.0160 
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Table 2: Portfolios of debt issue and share issue based on four quartiles of Vega and four 
quartiles of leverage 
 
Table 2a 
Portfolios of debt issuance based on four quartiles of Vega and four quartiles of leverage  
V1, V2, V3 & V4 represent 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 & 4
th
 quartiles of Vega respectively. LL1, LL2, LL3 & LL4 repre-
sent 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 & 4
th
 quartiles of lagged leverage respectively.  
 
Mean debt issue 
Vega /Leverage 
Quartiles 
LL1 LL2 LL3 LL4 Difference be-
tween LL1 and 
LL4
a
 
V1 1.60%**   1.27%***  1.40%*** 1.72%*** 0.12% 
V2 2.00%** 2.36%**  1.40%*** 1.20%*** - 
V3 2.15%** 2.10%** 1.89%** 0.60%*** - 
V4 2.62%** 1.79%** 1.70%**    0.98%**   -1.64%** 
Difference between 
V1 and V4
a
 
1.02%** - -   -0.74%  
 
a 
We calculate the difference only between 1
st
 quartile and 4
th
 quartile (between two extremes) 
  
Table 2b  
Portfolios of share issuance based on four quartiles of Vega and four quartiles of leverage 
   V1, V2, V3 & V4 represent 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 & 4
th
 quartiles of Vega respectively. LL1, LL2, LL3 & LL4 repre-
sent 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 & 4
th
 quartiles of lagged leverage respectively.  
 
Mean share issue 
Vega /Leverage 
Quartiles 
LL1 LL2 LL3 LL4 Difference be-
tween LL1 and 
LL4
a
 
V1      1.99%** 1.31%*** 1.63%*** 2.48*** 0.49%** 
V2 1.10%*** 0.96%*** 0.51%***   1.19%*** - 
V3 0.37%***    -1.11%**    -0.45%***  0.84%*** - 
V4    -1.92%**    -2.21%**    -1.00%** -0.57%*** -1.35%** 
Difference be-
tween V1 and 
V4
b
 
   -3.91%** - -      -3.05%  
 
b 
We calculate the difference only between 1
st
 quartile and 4
th
 quartile (between two extremes) 
 
 
 
Table 3: Pearson correlation 
This table presents correlation coefficients of the dependent and control variables. Debt issue is the proceeds from gross debt issuance minus debt retired. Share 
issue is the proceeds from common and preferred share issuance minus share repurchase. Vega is the change in CEOs wealth from stock options due to a 1% 
change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs wealth due to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is log (1+proceeds from sales). Leverage is the ratio 
of long-term debt over book value of total assets. MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant and 
equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by total assets. Cash is total cash and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. 
RD is total expenditures of research and development scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets. Divi-
dend is total cash dividends payout scaled by book value of total assets. The sample period is 1992-2006 inclusive.  
 
  debt issuet share issuet 
log of 
(1+Vega t)  
log of 
(1+Delta t)  Leverage t-1  Sales t-1  MB t-1  Capex t  Cashflow t-1  Cash t-1  GPPE t-1  RD t-1  Dividend t-1  
debt issue t 
1.00 
            share issue t 
-0.05 
(0.00) 1.00 
           log of 
(1+Vega t)  0.01 
(0.46) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 1.00 
          log of 
(1+Delta t)  0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0.57 
(0.00) 1.00 
         Leverage t-1  
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 1.00 
         Sales t-1 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.26 
(0.00) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 1.00 
       MB t-1  
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
-0.25 
(0.00) 
-0.21 
(0.00) 1.00 
      Capex t 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.77) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 1.00 
     Cashflowt-1 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.30 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 1.00 
    Cash t-1 
-0.01 
(0.39) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.36 
(0.00) 
-0.45 
(0.00) 
0.43 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 1.00 
   GPPE t-1 
-0.00 
(0.83) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.21 
(0.00) 
0.43 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.36 
(0.00) 1.00 
  RD t-1  
0.00 
(0.64) 
0.22 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.36 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.33 
(0.00) 
0.56 
(0.00) 
-0.24 
(0.00) 1.00 
 Dividend t-1  
0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.17 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 1.00 
3
5
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Table 4: The impact of Vega on debt issue 
This table presents the OLS results of hypothesis 1a. Debt issue is the proceeds from gross debt issuance 
minus debt retired. Vega is the change in CEO wealth from stock options due to a 1% change in stock 
return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs wealth due to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is the pro-
ceeds from sales. Industry_adjusted_leverage is defined as Leverage minus industry mean leverage based 
on 2-digit SIC code. MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is 
gross property, plant and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by total 
assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. RD is total expenditures of 
research and development scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by 
book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if credit rating of a firm is availa-
ble, zero otherwise. CEO Wealth is the CEO total compensation. *, ** and *** represent statistical signif-
icance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  t statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable- Debt issue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0.008** 
  (2.15) 
    0.012*  
   (1.76)                           
     0.01 
(1.54) 
   0.012 
  (1.09) 
   0.032** 
  (2.53) 
Log(1+Vega)t 0.001** 
  (1.96) 
    0.003*** 
   (4.64) 
     0.003*** 
    (3.76) 
   0.003*** 
  (3.65) 
 0.004*** 
  (3.66) 
Log(1+Delta)t        0.001 
    (0.66) 
   0.001 
  (0.68) 
   0.001 
  (0.82) 
Industry_adjusted_leveraget-1     -0.103***   
(-15.45) 
   -0.103*** 
 (-15.42) 
 -0.102*** 
(-15.28) 
  -0.110*** 
(-16.23) 
Log(1+Salest-1)     -0.004*** 
  (-4.31) 
  -0.004*** 
  (-4.36) 
-0.003** 
 (-4.05) 
-0.005*** 
 (-5.51) 
MBt-1  0.001** 
   (1.99) 
    0.001* 
   (1.86) 
   0.001 
  (1.55) 
0.002*** 
  (2.97) 
Cashflowt-1      0.017* 
   (1.68) 
    0.017* 
   (1.67) 
   0.02* 
  (1.92) 
   0.015 
  (1.44) 
Capext  0.185*** 
 (11.47) 
  0.184*** 
 (11.42) 
  0.185*** 
(11.47) 
0.191*** 
 (11.40) 
RDt-1       0.021 
  (1.07) 
 0.062*** 
  (3.01) 
Ratingt-1      -0.004 
 (-0.42) 
  -0.004 
 (-0.49) 
Casht-1       -0.057** 
 (-7.60) 
GPPEt-1       -0.007** 
 (-2.11) 
Log(CEO Wealtht)      -0.000 
(-0.37) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 15,623 13,563 13,562 13,562 13,442 
R-squared 15.4% 19.5% 19.5% 19.5% 19.8% 
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Table 5: The impact of Vega on debt issue in high-levered firms 
This table presents the OLS results of hypothesis 1b.  Debt issue is the proceeds from gross debt issuance 
minus the amount of gross debt retired. Vega is the change in CEO wealth from stock options due to a 1% 
change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEO wealth due to a 1% change in stock price. 
Sales is the proceeds from sales denoted in millions. High_leverage is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the industry_adjusted_leverage of a firm is equal to 75 percentiles or above of the sample for a given 
year. MB is the ratio between market value of total assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is gross 
property, plant and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by book value 
of total assets. Cash is total cash and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. RD is total ex-
penditures of research and development scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure 
scaled by book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if the credit rating of a 
firm is available, zero otherwise. CEO Wealth is CEO total compensation. *, ** and *** represent statis-
tical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. t statistics are in parentheses. . 
 
Dependent variable- debt issue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant   0.02*** 
 (2.91) 
  0.018** 
 (2.56) 
  0.02* 
 (1.76) 
  0.041*** 
 (3.21) 
Log(1+Vega)t   0.004*** 
 (5.33) 
  0.004*** 
 (4.40) 
  0.004*** 
 (4.29) 
  0.004*** 
 (4.22) 
Log(1+Delta)t    0.001 
 (0.96) 
  0.001 
 (0.98) 
  0.001 
 (1.08) 
High_leveraget-1  -0.011* 
(-1.85) 
 -0.011* 
(-1.81) 
 -0.01* 
(-1.77) 
 -0.015** 
(-2.51) 
Log(1+Vega)t*High_leveraget-1  -0.004*** 
(-3.09) 
 -0.004*** 
(-3.13) 
 -0.004** 
(-3.13) 
 -0.004** 
(-2.60) 
Log(1+Salest-1)  -0.004*** 
(-5.38) 
 -0.005*** 
(-5.46) 
 -0.004** 
(-5.09) 
 -0.006*** 
(-6.22) 
MBt-1   0.002** 
 (2.32) 
  0.001** 
 (2.48) 
  0.001* 
 (1.78) 
  0.002*** 
 (2.88) 
Cashflowt-1   0.025*** 
 (2.51) 
  0.025*** 
 (2.48) 
  0.029*** 
 (2.73) 
  0.026** 
 (2.47) 
Capext   0.184*** 
(11.37) 
  0.183*** 
 (11.31) 
  0.184*** 
(11.36) 
  0.193*** 
(11.49) 
RDt-1     0.027 
 (1.19) 
  0.058*** 
 (2.77) 
Ratingt-1    -0.004 
(-0.47) 
 -0.005 
(-0.56) 
Casht-1     -0.048*** 
(-6.40) 
GPPEt-1     -0.009*** 
(-2.54) 
Log (CEO Wealtht)     -0.001 
(-0.72) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 13,563 13,562 13,562 13,442 
R-squared 19.1% 19.1% 19.1% 19.3% 
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Table 6: The impact of Vega on share issue 
This table presents the OLS results of hypothesis 2a. Share issue is the proceeds from common and pre-
ferred share issuance minus gross share repurchase. Vega is the change in CEO wealth from stock options 
due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs wealth due to a 1% change in 
stock price. Sales is log (1+proceeds from sales). Industry_adjusted_leverage is defined as Leverage mi-
nus industry mean leverage based on 2-digit SIC code. MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to 
book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant and equipment over book value of total assets. 
Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by total assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets over book value total 
assets. RD is total expenditures of research and development scaled by book value of total assets. Capex 
is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets. Dividend is total cash dividends payout scaled 
by book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if credit rating of a firm is avail-
able, zero otherwise. CEO Wealth is CEO total compensation. *, ** and *** represent statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  t statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable- share issue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant    0.032*** 
(10.19) 
   0.064*** 
(11.50) 
   0.055*** 
  (9.59) 
  0.046*** 
 (5.01) 
  0.060*** 
 (5.72) 
Log(1+Vega)t   -0.007** 
(-11.61) 
 -0.005*** 
(-7.13) 
  -0.007*** 
 (-9.20) 
 -0.007*** 
(-9.85) 
 -0.007*** 
(-8.14) 
Log(1+Delta)t      0.004*** 
  (6.15) 
  0.004*** 
 (6.32) 
   0.005*** 
 (6.77) 
Industry_adjusted_leveraget-1    0.053*** 
 (9.41) 
   0.054*** 
  (9.63) 
  0.058*** 
(10.23) 
  0.046*** 
 (8.02) 
Log(1+Salest-1)   -0.006*** 
(-8.19) 
  -0.006*** 
 (-8.88) 
 -0.005*** 
(-7.21) 
 -0.007*** 
(-9.20) 
MBt-1    0.005*** 
 (9.72) 
  0.005*** 
 (8.59) 
  0.004*** 
 (6.55) 
  0.006*** 
 (9.13) 
Cashflowt-1   -0.143*** 
(-17.04) 
 -0.144*** 
(-17.21) 
 -0.123*** 
(-13.92) 
 -0.135*** 
(-14.99) 
Capex t     0.087*** 
 (6.37) 
  0.083*** 
 (6.06) 
  0.089*** 
 (6.55) 
  0.073*** 
 (5.18) 
RDt-1      0.128*** 
 (7.53) 
  0.178*** 
(10.18) 
Ratingt-1     -0.003 
(-0.45) 
 -0.003 
(-0.46) 
Casht-1      -0.063*** 
(-9.96) 
GPPEt-1       0.006** 
 (2.05) 
Dividend t-1      -0.076 
(-1.22) 
Log(CEO Wealtht)       0.000 
 (0.10) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 15,623 13,563 13,562 13,562 13,442 
R-squared 27.5% 32.4% 32.6% 33.0% 33.7% 
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Table 7: The impact of Vega on share issue in high-levered firms 
This table presents the OLS results of hypothesis 2b.  Share issue is the proceeds from common and pre-
ferred share issuance minus gross share repurchase. Vega is the change in CEO wealth from stock options 
due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs wealth due to a 1% change in 
stock price. Sales is the proceeds from sales denoted in millions. High_leverage is a dummy variable and 
equals one if the industry_adjusted_leverage of a firm is equal to 75 percentiles or above of the sample 
for a given year.. MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is 
gross property, plant and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by book 
value of total assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. RD is total ex-
penditures of research and development scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure 
scaled by book value of total assets. Dividend is total cash dividends payout scaled by book value of total 
assets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if the credit rating of a firm is available, zero other-
wise. CEO Wealth is CEO total compensation. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively.  t statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable-Share issuet 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant    0.061*** 
(10.89) 
  0.052*** 
 (8.80) 
  0.042*** 
 (4.53) 
  0.058*** 
 (5.47) 
Log(1+Vega)t   -0.005*** 
 (-7.05) 
 -0.007*** 
(-8.90) 
 -0.007*** 
(-9.48) 
 -0.007*** 
(-8.29) 
Log(1+Delta)t    0.004*** 
 (5.93) 
  0.004*** 
 (6.09) 
  0.004*** 
 (6.55) 
High_leveraget-1    0.004 
  (0.74) 
  0.005 
 (1.00) 
  0.006 
 (1.27) 
  0.001 
 (0.15) 
Log(1+Vega)t*High_leveraget-1    0.002* 
  (1.74) 
  0.002 
 (1.52) 
  0.002 
 (1.47) 
  0.003** 
 (2.09) 
Sales t-1   -0.005*** 
 (-7.51) 
 -0.006*** 
 (-8.17) 
 -0.005*** 
(-6.51) 
 -0.007*** 
(-8.77) 
MBt-1    0.005*** 
  (9.39) 
   0.005** 
  (8.29) 
  0.004*** 
 (6.30) 
  0.006*** 
 (9.20) 
Cashflowt-1   -0.148*** 
(-17.71) 
  -0.15*** 
(-17.89) 
 -0.129*** 
(-14.64) 
 -0.140*** 
(-15.63) 
Capex t    0.087*** 
  (6.37) 
   0.083*** 
  (6.07) 
  0.089*** 
 (6.54) 
  0.072*** 
 (5.08) 
RDt-1     0.124*** 
 (7.31) 
  0.180*** 
(10.23) 
Ratingt-1    -0.003 
(-0.41) 
 -0.003 
(-0.44) 
Casht-1     -0.068*** 
(-10.77) 
GPPEt-1      0.007** 
 (2.28) 
Dividendt-1     -0.103* 
(-1.65) 
CEO Wealth t      0.000 
 (0.27) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 13,563 13,562 13,562 13,442 
R-squared 32.2% 32.4% 32.7% 33.6% 
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Table 8: The impact of Vega on debt issuance 
This table presents the logistic regression results of hypothesis 1a.  Debt issuance is a dummy variable 
and equals one if the net debt issuance is at least 1% of total assets, zero otherwise. Vega is the change in 
CEO wealth from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs 
wealth due to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is the proceeds from sales denoted in millions. Indus-
try_adjusted_leverage is defined as Leverage minus industry mean leverage based on 2-digit SIC code. 
MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant 
and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by total assets. Cash is cash 
and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. RD is total expenditures of research and develop-
ment scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total as-
sets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if credit rating of a firm is available, zero otherwise. 
CEO Wealth is CEO total compensation. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively.  z statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
Dependent variable-Debt issuancet 
 (1)     (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(1+Vega)t  0.046*** 
(2.61) 
  0.072*** 
 (3.44) 
 0.083*** 
(3.47) 
 0.088*** 
(3.64) 
  0.085*** 
 (2.94) 
Log(1+Delta)t   -0.022 
(-0.98) 
-0.023 
(-1.02) 
 -0.020 
(-0.87) 
Industry_adjusted_leveraget-1   -0.98*** 
(-5.34) 
-0.987*** 
(-5.38) 
 -1.025*** 
(-5.55) 
 -1.521*** 
(-7.85) 
Log(1+Sales t-1)    0.008 
 (0.35) 
 0.011 
(0.47) 
  0.001 
 (0.03) 
 -0.075*** 
(-3.02) 
MBt-1   -0.04** 
(-2.02) 
-0.037* 
(-1.85) 
 -0.025 
 (-1.23) 
  0.037* 
 (1.68) 
Cashflowt-1    0.599** 
 (2.07) 
 0.602** 
(2.08) 
   0.388 
  (1.27) 
 -0.138 
(-0.12) 
Capex t    6.152*** 
(13.71) 
 6.173*** 
(13.73) 
  6.113*** 
(13.58) 
  6.293*** 
(13.24) 
RDt-1     -1.316** 
(-2.21) 
  1.229* 
 (1.93) 
Ratingt-1     -0.013 
(-0.06) 
  0.038 
 (0.16) 
Casht-1      -3.216*** 
(-13.68) 
GPPEt-1      -0.176* 
(-1.90) 
Log(CEO Wealtht)       0.030 
 (0.96) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 14,108 12,133 12,132 12,132 12,013 
Log-likelihood -6,425 -5,351 -5,350 -5,348 -5,182 
Chi-square 13 276 277 282 491 
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Table 9: The impact of Vega on debt issuance in high-levered firms 
This table presents the logistic regression results of hypothesis 1b.  Debt issuance is a dummy variable 
and equals one if the net debt issuance is at least 1% of total assets or else it takes a zero value. Vega is 
the change in CEO wealth from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the 
change in CEOs wealth due to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is  the proceeds from sales denoted in 
millions. High_leverage is a dummy variable and equals one if the industry_adjusted_leverage of a firm 
is equal to 75 percentiles or above of the sample for a given year.  MB is the ratio of market value of total 
assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant and equipment over book value of total 
assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by book value of total assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets 
over book value total assets. RD is the total expenditures of research and development scaled by book 
value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy 
variable and equals one if credit rating of a firm is available, zero otherwise. CEO Wealth is CEO total 
compensation. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
z statistics are in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable-Debt issuancet 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(1+Vega)t   0.102*** 
 (4.36) 
  0.11*** 
 (4.24) 
   0.114*** 
  (4.38) 
 0.106*** 
(3.48) 
Log(1+Delta)t   -0.017 
(-0.77) 
  -0.018 
 (-0.81) 
-0.014 
(-0.63) 
High_leveraget-1   0.183 
 (1.17) 
  0.176 
 (1.13) 
   0.162 
  (1.04) 
-0.020 
(-0.13) 
Log(1+Vega)t*High_leveraget-1  -0.12*** 
(-3.12) 
 -0.118*** 
(-3.08) 
 -0.117*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.094** 
(-2.41) 
Log(Salest-1)  -0.001 
(-0.06) 
  0.001 
 (0.01) 
 -0.009 
(-0.40) 
-0.083*** 
(-3.35) 
MBt-1  -0.039** 
(-1.97) 
 -0.035* 
(-1.83) 
 -0.025 
(-1.22) 
 0.036 
(1.63) 
Cashflowt-1   0.687** 
 (2.39) 
  0.69** 
 (2.40) 
  0.485 
 (1.60) 
 0.135 
(0.43) 
Capex t   6.135*** 
(13.65) 
  6.152*** 
(13.67) 
  6.094*** 
(13.51) 
 6.305*** 
(13.25) 
RDt-1    -1.269** 
(-2.13) 
 1.196* 
(1.88) 
Ratingt-1    -0.007 
(-0.03) 
 0.037 
(0.16) 
Casht-1    -3.145*** 
(-13.18) 
GPPEt-1    -0.192*** 
(-2.08) 
Log(CEO Wealtht)     0.024 
(0.76) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 12,133 12,132 12,132 12,013 
Log likelihood -5,348 -5,348 -5,345 -5,187 
Chi-square 281 282 287 479 
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Table 10: The impact of Vega on share issuance 
This table presents the logistic regression results of hypothesis 2a.  Share issuance is a dummy variable 
and equals one if the net share issuance is at least 1% of total assets, zero otherwise. Vega is the change in 
CEO wealth from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs 
wealth due to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is the proceeds from sales denoted in millions. Indus-
try_adjusted_leverage is defined as Leverage minus industry mean leverage based on 2-digit SIC code. 
MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant 
and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by total assets. Cash is cash 
and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. RD is total expenditures of research and develop-
ment scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total as-
sets. Dividend is total cash dividends payout scaled by book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy vari-
able and equals one if credit rating of a firm is available, zero otherwise. CEO Wealth is CEO total com-
pensation. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  z 
statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
Dependent variable-Share issuancet 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(1+Vega)t -0.000 
(-0.03) 
  0.039 
 (1.61) 
-0.088*** 
(-3.16) 
 -0.105*** 
(-3.84) 
 -0.166*** 
(-4.79) 
Log(1+Delta)t     0.256*** 
 (9.97) 
  0.261*** 
(10.14) 
   0.263*** 
(10.05) 
Industry_adjusted_leveraget-1    0.519*** 
 (2.52) 
  0.57*** 
 (2.74) 
  0.689*** 
 (3.27) 
   0.551*** 
  (2.56) 
Log(1+Salest-1)   -0.231*** 
(-8.48) 
 -0.269*** 
(-9.64) 
 -0.225*** 
(-7.87) 
  -0.236*** 
 (-7.79) 
MBt-1    0.216*** 
(10.50) 
  0.182*** 
 (8.70) 
  0.149*** 
 (7.02) 
   0.150*** 
  (6.68) 
Cashflowt-1   -1.543*** 
(-5.14) 
 -1.666*** 
(-5.51) 
 -0.959*** 
(-2.99) 
  -0.843*** 
 (-2.58) 
Capex t    1.862*** 
 (3.95) 
  1.691*** 
 (3.57) 
  1.981*** 
 (4.17) 
   2.148*** 
  (4.31) 
RDt-1      4.268*** 
 (7.16) 
   4.638*** 
  (7.44) 
Ratingt-1     -0.028 
(-0.10) 
  -0.053 
 (-0.19) 
Casht-1       -0.511** 
 (-2.23) 
GPPEt-1       -0.265** 
 (-2.38) 
Dividendt-1       -8.462*** 
 (-3.10) 
Log(CEO Wealtht)        0.089*** 
 (2.64) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes Yes   Yes 
Firm-year observations 11,761 9,926 9,925 9,925  9,827 
Log-likelihood -4,786 -3,843 -3,794 -3,765 -3,706 
Chi-square 17 323 435 487  518 
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Table 11: The impact of Vega on share issuance in high-levered firms 
This table presents the logistic regression results of hypothesis 2b.  Share issuance is a dummy variable 
and equals one if the net share issuance is at least 1% of total assets, zero otherwise. Vega is the change in 
CEO wealth from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs 
wealth due to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is the proceeds from sales denoted in millions. 
High_leverage is a dummy variable and equals one if the industry_adjusted_leverage of a firm is equal to 
75 percentiles or above of the sample for a given year.. MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to 
book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant and equipment over book value of total assets. 
Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by book value of total assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets over 
book value total assets. RD is the total expenditures of research and development scaled by book value of 
total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets. Dividend is total cash divi-
dends payout scaled by book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if credit 
rating of a firm is available, zero otherwise. CEO Wealth is CEO total compensation. *, ** and *** repre-
sent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  z statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
Dependent variable-Share issuancet 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(1+Vega)t   0.024 
 (0.88) 
 -0.096*** 
(-3.23) 
 -0.112*** 
(-3.76) 
 -0.166*** 
(-4.79) 
Log(1+Delta)t    0.255*** 
 (9.92) 
  0.26*** 
 (10.10) 
  0.263*** 
(10.01) 
High_leveraget-1  -0.029 
(-0.15) 
  0.07 
 (0.37) 
  0.135 
 (0.72) 
  0.056 
 (0.29) 
Log(1+Vega)t*High_leveraget-1   0.057 
 (1.23) 
  0.035 
 (0.74) 
  0.029 
 (0.62) 
  0.041 
 (0.87) 
Log(1+Salest-1)  -0.226*** 
(-8.31) 
 -0.264*** 
(-9.49) 
 -0.219*** 
(-7.68) 
 -0.232*** 
(-7.65) 
MBt-1   0.216*** 
(10.54) 
  0.182*** 
 (8.72) 
  0.149*** 
 (7.02) 
  0.151*** 
 (6.73) 
Cashflowt-1  -1.565*** 
(-5.24) 
 -1.688*** 
(-5.60) 
 -0.979*** 
(-3.07) 
 -0.857*** 
(-2.64) 
Capex t   1.891*** 
 (4.01) 
  1.711*** 
 (3.61) 
  2.004*** 
 (4.21) 
  2.155*** 
 (4.32) 
RDt-1     4.295*** 
 (7.21) 
  4.690*** 
 (7.52) 
Ratingt-1    -0.021 
(-0.07) 
 -0.048 
(-0.17) 
Casht-1     -0.530** 
(-2.33) 
GPPEt-1     -0.255** 
(-2.29) 
Dividendt-1     -8.479*** 
(-3.10) 
Log(CEO Wealtht)      0.092*** 
 (2.71) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 9,926 9,925 9,925 9,827 
Log likelihood -3,841 -3,790 -3,763 -3,704 
Chi-square  336 437 490  521 
. 
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Table 12: The impact of Vega on debt repurchase 
This table presents the logistic regression results for hypothesis 3a. Debt retirement is a dummy variable 
and equals one if the net share issuance is -0.5% or less of total assets.  Vega is the change in CEO wealth 
from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs wealth due 
to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is the proceeds from sales denoted in millions. Indus-
try_adjusted_leverage is defined as Leverage minus industry mean leverage based on 2-digit SIC code. 
MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant 
and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by total assets. Cash is cash 
and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. RD is total expenditures of research and develop-
ment scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total as-
sets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if credit rating of a firm is available, zero otherwise. 
CEO Wealth is CEO total compensation. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively.  z statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
Dependent variable-Debt Retirementt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(1+Vega)t -0.038** 
(-2.19) 
 -0.097*** 
(-4.72) 
 -0.062** 
(-2.63) 
 -0.059*** 
(-2.48) 
 -0.096*** 
(-3.40) 
Log(1+Delta)t    -0.065*** 
(-2.99) 
 -0.066*** 
(-3.02) 
 -0.058*** 
(-2.63) 
Industry_adjusted_leveraget-1    3.066*** 
(16.39) 
  3.045*** 
(16.26) 
  3.016*** 
(16.07) 
  2.94*** 
(15.37) 
Log(1+Salest-1)    0.102*** 
 (4.44) 
  0.11*** 
 (4.76) 
  0.102*** 
 (4.33) 
  0.093*** 
 (3.80) 
MBt-1   -0.091*** 
(-4.35) 
 -0.081*** 
(-3.84) 
 -0.072*** 
(-3.33) 
 -0.059*** 
(-2.64) 
Cashflowt-1   -0.408 
(-1.44) 
 -0.394 
(-1.39) 
 -0.57* 
(-1.89) 
 -0.703** 
(-2.31) 
Capex t   -3.903*** 
(-8.07) 
 -3.838*** 
(-7.93) 
 -3.88*** 
(-8.00) 
 -4.246*** 
(-8.34) 
RDt-1     -1.001* 
(-1.72) 
 -0.820 
(-1.34) 
Ratingt-1      0.301 
 (1.24) 
  0.291 
 (1.20) 
Casht-1      -0.225 
(-1.02) 
GPPEt-1       0.223** 
 (2.43) 
Log(CEO Wealtht)      0.058* 
(1.87) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 14,256 12,229 12,228 12,188 12,099 
Log-likelihood -6,606 -5,384 -5,379 -5,376 -5,313 
Chi-square 16 524 524 528 531 
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Table 13: The impact of Vega on debt repurchase in high-levered firms 
This table presents the logistic regression results for hypothesis 3b. Debt retirement is a dummy variable 
and equals one if the net share issuance is -0.5% of less of total assets.  Vega is the change in CEO wealth 
from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs wealth due 
to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is the proceeds from sales denoted in millions. High_leverage is a 
dummy variable and equals one if the industry_adjusted_leverage of a firm is equal to 75 percentiles or 
above of the sample for a given year..  MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total 
assets. GPPE is gross property, plant and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA 
scaled by book value of total assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. 
RD is total expenditures of research and development scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capi-
tal expenditure scaled by book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if credit 
rating of a firm is available, zero otherwise. CEO Wealth is CEO total compensation.  *, ** and *** rep-
resent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  z statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
Dependent variable-Debt Retirementt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(1+Vega)t   -0.131*** 
 (-5.70) 
 -0.093*** 
(-3.63) 
 -0.089*** 
(-3.48) 
  -0.128*** 
 (-4.29) 
Log(1+Delta)t   -0.074*** 
(-3.42) 
 -0.075*** 
 (-3.47) 
  -0.066*** 
 (-3.00) 
High_leveraget-1    0.114 
  (0.75) 
  0.087 
 (0.57) 
   0.074 
  (0.48) 
    0.103 
   (0.66) 
Log(1+Vega)t*High_leveraget-1    0.146*** 
  (3.89) 
  0.152*** 
 (4.03) 
   0.153*** 
  (4.05) 
    0.142*** 
   (3.74) 
Log(1+Salest-1)    0.122*** 
  (5.40) 
  0.131*** 
 (5.75) 
   0.121*** 
  (5.22) 
    0.103*** 
   (4.25) 
MBt-1   -0.098*** 
 (-4.78) 
 -0.087*** 
(-4.20) 
  -0.076*** 
 (-3.56) 
   -0.055*** 
  (-2.48) 
Cashflowt-1   -0.715*** 
 (-2.58) 
 -0.698*** 
(-2.52) 
  -0.912*** 
 (-3.10) 
   -1.086*** 
  (-3.64) 
Capex t   -3.803*** 
 (-7.90) 
 -3.723*** 
(-7.73) 
   -3.775*** 
  (-7.83) 
   -4.237*** 
  (-8.32) 
RDt-1      -1.221** 
  (-2.13) 
   -0.768 
  (-1.28) 
Ratingt-1       0.323 
   (1.33) 
    0.314 
   (1.30) 
Casht-1       -0.545** 
  (-2.51) 
GPPEt-1        0.248*** 
   (2.72) 
Log(CEO Wealtht)        0.067** 
   (2.19) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 12,229 12,228 12,228 12,099 
Log likelihood -5,443 -5,436 -5,433 -5,362 
Chi-square  398  410 417 433 
 
. 
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Table 14: The impact of Vega on share repurchase 
This table presents the logistic regression results for hypothesis 4a. Share repurchase is a dummy variable 
and equals one if the net share issuance is -0.5% or less of total assets.  Vega is the change in CEO wealth 
from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEOs wealth due 
to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is the proceeds from sales denoted in millions. Indus-
try_adjusted_leverage is defined as Leverage minus industry mean leverage based on 2-digit SIC code. 
MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant 
and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by total assets. Cash is cash 
and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. RD is total expenditures of research and develop-
ment scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total as-
sets. Dividend is cash dividend payout scaled by book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy variable 
and equals one if credit rating of a firm is available, zero otherwise. CEO Wealth is CEO total compensa-
tion.  *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  z statis-
tics are in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable-Share Repurchaset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(1+Vega)t     0.307*** 
 (15.80) 
   0.249*** 
(10.55) 
 0.255*** 
(9.51) 
 0.259*** 
(9.62) 
  0.252*** 
 (7.89) 
Log(1+Delta)t   -0.012 
(-0.48) 
-0.013 
(-0.52) 
 -0.008 
(-0.34) 
Industry_adjusted_leveraget-1   -2.081*** 
(-9.46) 
 -2.085*** 
(-9.48) 
 -2.113*** 
(-9.57) 
 -1.808*** 
(-7.95) 
Log(1+Sales t-1)    0.170*** 
 (6.64) 
  0.171*** 
 (6.64) 
  0.163*** 
 (6.19) 
  0.174*** 
 (6.22) 
MBt-1   -0.099*** 
(-4.19) 
 -0.097*** 
(-4.07) 
 -0.089*** 
(-3.66) 
 -0.133*** 
(-5.15) 
Cashflowt-1     5.633*** 
(14.51) 
  5.634*** 
(14.52) 
   5.526*** 
(14.03) 
   5.610*** 
(13.71) 
Capex t   -2.654*** 
(-4.74) 
 -2.641*** 
(-4.71) 
 -2.704*** 
(-4.81) 
  -1.923*** 
 (-3.31) 
RDt-1     -1.214* 
(-1.73) 
  -1.964*** 
 (-2.67) 
Ratingt-1     -0.093 
(-0.34) 
  -0.071 
 (-0.26) 
Casht-1        0.913*** 
  (3.79) 
GPPEt-1       -0.272** 
 (-2.50) 
Dividendt-1        8.494*** 
  (3.90) 
Log(CEO Wealth t)        0.011 
  (0.30) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 13,157 11,120 11,119 11,119 11,010 
Log-likelihood -5,614 -4,462 -4,462 -4,457 -4,399 
Chi-square 270 689 689 692 719 
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Table 15: The impact of Vega on share repurchase in highly levered firms 
This table presents the logistic regression results for hypothesis 4b. Share repurchase is a dummy varia-
ble and equals one if the net share issuance is -0.5% or less of total assets.  Vega is the change in CEO 
wealth from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEO 
wealth due to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is the proceeds from sales donated in millions. 
High_leverage is a dummy variable and equals one if the industry_adjusted_leverage of a firm is equal to 
75 percentiles or above of the sample for a given year.  MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to 
book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant and equipment over book value of total assets. 
Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by book value of total assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets over 
book value total assets. RD is total expenditures of research and development scaled by book value of 
total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets. Dividend is total cash divi-
dends payout scaled by book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if credit 
rating of a firm is available, zero otherwise. CEO Wealth is CEO total compensation. *, ** and *** repre-
sent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  z statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
Dependent variable-Share Repurchaset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(1+Vega)t  0.248*** 
(9.74) 
  0.252*** 
 (8.91) 
   0.256*** 
  (9.00) 
   0.256*** 
  (7.69) 
Log(1+Delta)t   -0.008 
(-0.31) 
  -0.009 
 (-0.35) 
  -0.004 
 (-0.15) 
High_leveraget-1 -0.443** 
(-2.25) 
 -0.445** 
 (2.26) 
  -0.457*** 
 (-2.32) 
  -0.324 
 (-1.62) 
Log(1+Vega)t*High_leveraget-1  -0.019 
(-0.41) 
  -0.018 
 (-0.39) 
  -0.017 
 (-0.37) 
  -0.034 
 (-0.72) 
Log(1+Sales t-1)   0.151*** 
 (5.95) 
   0.152*** 
  (5.94) 
   0.144*** 
  (5.51) 
   0.161*** 
  (5.79) 
MBt-1  -0.089*** 
(-3.82) 
  -0.088*** 
 (-3.72) 
  -0.080*** 
 (-3.32) 
  -0.132** 
 (-5.13) 
Cashflowt-1    5.705*** 
(14.74) 
   5.705*** 
(14.74) 
    5.602*** 
 (14.26) 
   5.706*** 
(13.98) 
Capex t   -2.570*** 
(-4.62) 
  -2.562*** 
 (-4.60) 
   -2.622*** 
  (-4.70) 
  -1.802*** 
 (-3.13) 
RDt-1      -1.30* 
  (-1.63) 
  -2.058*** 
 (-2.81) 
Ratingt-1      -0.099 
  (-0.37) 
  -0.074 
 (-0.27) 
Casht-1       1.086*** 
 (4.58) 
GPPEt-1     -0.293*** 
(-2.70) 
Dividendt-1       9.714*** 
  (4.23) 
Log(CEO Wealtht)      0.005 
 (4.23) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 11,120 11,119 11,119 11,010 
Log likelihood -4,476 -4,476 -4,474 -4,407 
Chi-square  661  661 664 703 
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Table 16: Over-leverage based on Target debt ratio estimated from firm fundamentals 
This table presents the logistic regression results for hypothesis 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b based on target debt 
ratio which is estimated from firm fundamentals. Debt issuance, retirement, Share issuance and repur-
chase are dummy variables and equals one if the net debt issuance is 1% or more, -0.5% or less, and share 
issuance is 1% or more and -0.5% or less of total assets respectively.  Vega is the change in CEO wealth 
from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEO wealth due 
to a 1% change in stock price. Sales is the proceeds from sales donated in millions. Over_leverage is a 
dummy variable and equals one if the long-term leverage of a firm is above its target leverage in a given 
year.  MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. GPPE is gross property, 
plant and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by book value of total 
assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets over book value total assets. RD is total expenditures of 
research and development scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by 
book value of total assets. Dividend is total cash dividends payout scaled by book value of total assets. 
Rating is a dummy variable and equals one if credit rating of a firm is available, zero otherwise. CEO 
Wealth is CEO total compensation. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively.  z statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
     Debt  
Issuance 
   Share  
Issuance 
   Debt  
Retirement 
    Share 
Repurchase 
 (1)   (2)      (3)    (4) 
Log(1+Vega)t   0.115*** 
 (3.50) 
 -0.181*** 
(-4.90) 
  -0.136*** 
 (-4.22) 
  0.293*** 
 (8.82) 
Log(1+Delta)t  -0.014 
(-0.61) 
  0.262*** 
 (9.98) 
  -0.065** 
 (-2.94) 
 -0.002 
(-0.08) 
Over_leveraget-1  -0.010 
(-0.07) 
 -0.128 
(-0.76) 
   0.290** 
  (2.08) 
  0.027 
 (0.16) 
Log(1+Vega)t*Over_leveraget-1  -0.072** 
(-2.09) 
  0.063 
 (1.55) 
   0.091*** 
  (2.68) 
 -0.103*** 
(-2.62) 
Log(1+Sales t-1)  -0.086*** 
(-3.48) 
 -0.229*** 
(-7.55) 
   0.111*** 
  (4.56) 
  0.155*** 
 (5.57) 
MBt-1   0.039* 
 (1.81) 
  0.150*** 
 (6.67) 
  -0.060*** 
 (-2.71) 
 -0.129** 
(-5.00) 
Cashflowt-1   0.302 
 (0.97) 
 -0.944*** 
(-2.92) 
  -1.314*** 
  (4.44) 
  5.889*** 
(14.44) 
Capex t   6.344*** 
(13.34) 
  2.128*** 
 (4.28) 
  -4.353*** 
 (-8.52) 
 -1.742*** 
(-3.02) 
RDt-1   1.313** 
 (2.07) 
  4.602*** 
 (7.38) 
  -0.896 
 (-1.49) 
 -1.979*** 
(-2.70) 
Ratingt-1   0.044 
 (0.18) 
 -0.053 
(-0.19) 
   0.283 
  (1.17) 
 -0.058 
(-0.21) 
Casht-1  -3.204*** 
(-13.30) 
 -0.530** 
(-2.30) 
  -0.329 
 (-1.50) 
  0.984*** 
 (4.08) 
GPPEt-1  -0.161* 
(-1.75) 
-0.269** 
(-2.41) 
   0.194** 
  (2.12) 
-0.263** 
(-2.42) 
Dividendt-1    
 
 -8.833*** 
(-3.23) 
   
 
  9.566*** 
 (4.41) 
Log(CEO Wealth t) 0.029 
(0.94) 
  0.089*** 
 (2.62) 
   0.058* 
  (1.87) 
  0.009 
 (0.26) 
Year dummy    Yes    Yes     Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect    Yes     Yes     Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 12,013  9,827 12,099 11,010 
Log likelihood -5,195 -3,706  -5,355  -4,411 
Chi-square     464     517     447    705 
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Table 17: High_leverage,  low_leverage, and their interactions with Vega 
Debt issue is the proceeds from gross debt issuance minus gross debt retired.  Vega is the change in CEO 
wealth from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEO 
wealth due to a 1% change in stock price. Asset is log (1+book value of total assets)  High_leverage is a 
dummy variable and equals one if the leverage of a firm is equal to 75 percentiles or above of sample lev-
erage. Low_leverage is a dummy variable and equals one if the leverage of a firm is equal to 25 percen-
tiles or less of sample leverage.  MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total as-
sets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by book value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by 
book value of total assets. .  *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  z statistics are in parentheses. 
Dependent variable-Debt issuet 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  0.022*** 
(3.02) 
 0.02*** 
(2.70) 
 0.011 
(1.46) 
Log(1+Vega)t  0.004*** 
(3.97) 
 0.003*** 
(3.18) 
 0.003*** 
(3.27) 
Log(1+Delta)t   0.000 
(1.23) 
 0.001 
(1.20) 
High_leveraget-1  -0.012** 
(-1.96) 
-0.012* 
(-1.93) 
-0.014*** 
(-2.33) 
Low_leveraget-1  -0.000 
(-0.02) 
 -0.000 
(-0.10) 
  0.001 
 (0.13) 
Log(1+Vega)t*High_leveraget-1  -0.003* 
(-1.81) 
 -0.003* 
(-1.83) 
 -0.003* 
(-1.76) 
Log(1+Vega)t*Low_leveraget-1   0.003* 
 (1.78) 
  0.003* 
 (1.83) 
  0.003* 
 (1.88) 
Asset t-1  -0.005*** 
(-5.54) 
 -0.005*** 
(-5.65) 
 -0.005*** 
(-6.07) 
MBt-1   0.001 
 (1.53) 
  0.001 
 (1.32) 
  0.001 
 (1.62) 
Cashflowt-1   0.018* 
 (1.87) 
  0.017* 
 (1.80) 
  0.015 
 (1.58) 
Capex t   0.197*** 
(12.18) 
  0.196*** 
(12.10) 
  0.187*** 
(11.50) 
Industry_mean_leveraget-1     0.064*** 
 (3.98) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Adjusted R-squared 7.41% 7.41% 7.53% 
 
Firm-year observations 13,563 13,562 13,562 
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Table 18: The effect of High_vega,  Low_vega,  High_leverage,  and Low_leverage on Security is-
sues 
Debt issue is the proceeds from gross debt issuance minus gross debt retired. Share issue is the proceeds 
from common and preferred share issuance minus gross share repurchase. Vega is the change in CEO 
wealth from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. High_vega is a dummy variable 
and equals one if the Vega of a CEO is equal to 75 percentiles or above of sample Vega. Low_vega is a 
dummy variable and equals one if the Vega of a CEO is equal to 25 percentiles or less of sample Vega. 
High_leverage is a dummy variable and equals one if the leverage of a firm is equal to 75 percentiles or 
above of sample leverage. Low_leverage is a dummy variable and equals one if the leverage of a firm is 
equal to 25 percentiles or less of sample leverage. Asset is log (1+book value of total assets).    MB is the 
ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. Cashflow is EBITDA scaled by book 
value of total assets. Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets. .  *, ** and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  z statistics are in parenthe-
ses. 
 
 Debt issuet Share issuet 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept  0.026*** 
(3.44) 
  0.061*** 
 (9.59) 
High_Vegat  0.006** 
(2.37) 
 -0.008*** 
(-4.24) 
Low_Vegat -0.008*** 
(-4.03) 
  0.008*** 
 (4.35) 
High_leveraget-1  -0.024** 
(-10.53) 
  0.008*** 
 (4.15) 
Low_leveraget-1   0.011*** 
 (4.51) 
 -0.13*** 
(-6.33) 
Asset t-1  -0.005*** 
(-5.61) 
 -0.007*** 
(-10.00) 
MBt-1   0.001** 
 (2.13) 
  0.006*** 
(10.51) 
Cashflowt-1   0.016* 
 (1.73) 
 -0.16*** 
(-19.94) 
Capex t   1.88*** 
(11.56) 
  0.082*** 
 (5.97) 
Industry_mean_leveraget-1   0.064*** 
 (4.00) 
  0.001 
 (0.11) 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R-squared 7.43% 22.78% 
Firm-year observations 13,563 13,563 
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Table 19: 2SLS Equations- Vega and Debt issue 
Debt issue is the proceeds from gross debt issuance minus gross debt retired.  Vega is the change in CEO 
wealth from stock options due to a 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is the change in CEO 
wealth due to a 1% change in stock price.  Sales is log (1+proceeds from sales). Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debt over book value of total assets. MB is the ratio of market value of total assets to book val-
ue of total assets. GPPE is gross property, plant and equipment over book value of total assets. Cashflow 
is EBITDA scaled by book value of total assets. Cash is cash and cash equivalent assets over book value 
total assets. RD is the total expenditures of research and development scaled by book value of total assets. 
Capex is capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets. Rating is a dummy variable and equals 
one if credit rating of a firm is available, otherwise. Cash compensation is the salary plus bonus CEOs 
receive. CEO wealth is the total compensation CEOs receive.  *, ** and *** represent statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  t statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 First-stage re-
gression 
Second stage 
regression 
First-stage 
regression 
Second stage 
regression 
 Log(1+Vega)t Debt issuet Log(1+Vega)t Debt issuet 
Intercept  -0.937*** 
(-10.17) 
 0.401*** 
(6.66) 
  -3.227*** 
(-22.96) 
  2.730*** 
 (5.33) 
Log(1+Vega)t   0.428*** 
(8.41) 
  0.841*** 
(5.57) 
Log(1+Delta)t  0.415*** 
(45.62) 
-0.174*** 
(-8.07) 
 0.256*** 
(23.45) 
 -0.212*** 
(-5.48) 
MBt-1  0.03*** 
(3.58) 
-0.01** 
(-2.54) 
- 0.010 
(-1.35) 
  0.011* 
 (1.69) 
Cashflowt-1  0.11 
(1.03) 
-0.038 
(-0.82) 
 0.268*** 
(2.79) 
 -0.214 
(-2.36) 
Salest-1  0.315*** 
(41.07) 
-0.139*** 
(-8.53) 
 0.128*** 
(12.35) 
 -0.111*** 
(-5.58) 
Leverage t-1 -0.065 
(-0.69) 
-0.24*** 
(-6.09) 
-0.083 
(-1.11) 
 -0.203*** 
(-3.60) 
Cash t-1  0.48*** 
(6.22) 
-0.23*** 
(-5.79) 
 0.161** 
(2.27) 
 -0.161*** 
(-2.61) 
RD t-1  2.293*** 
(11.83) 
-0.966*** 
(-6.80) 
 1.382*** 
(6.99) 
 -1.146*** 
(-4.46) 
Capex t -1.423*** 
(-8.37) 
 0.725*** 
(7.22) 
-0.628*** 
(-4.45) 
 0.639*** 
(4.36) 
Rating t-1  0.069 
(0.91) 
-0.026 
(-0.79) 
 0.069 
(1.16) 
 -0.053 
(-1.05) 
Log (Cash compensation)   0.066*** 
(3.26) 
 -0.060*** 
(-3.10) 
Log(CEO Wealth)    0.619*** 
(18.29) 
 -0.519*** 
(-5.09) 
CEO Age   -0.010*** 
(-9.61) 
 0.008*** 
(4.93) 
Leverage t 0.808*** 
(8.75) 
 0.419*** 
(5.67) 
 
R-squared 43.50%  62.37%  
Firm-year observations 13,536 13,536 12,527 12,527 
Wald Chi-squared  81.39  35.98 
 
 
 
